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AbstrACt
Objectives This paper explores the underlying 
motivations and strategies of formal small and medium-
sized formal private for-profit sector hospitals and clinics 
in urban Bangladesh and their implications for quality and 
access.
Methods This exploratory qualitative study was 
conducted in Dhaka, Sylhet and Khulna City Corporations. 
Data collection methods included key informant interviews 
(20) with government and private sector leaders, in-depth 
interviews (30) with clinic owners, managers and providers 
and exit interviews (30) with healthcare clients.
results Profit generation is a driving force behind entry 
into the private healthcare business and the provision 
of services. However, non-financial motivations are 
also emphasised such as aspirations to serve the 
disadvantaged, personal ambition, desire for greater social 
status, obligations to continue family business and adverse 
family events. The discussion of private sector motivations 
and strategies is framed using the Business Policy Model. 
This model is comprised of three components: products 
and services, and efforts to make these attractive 
including patient-friendly discounts and service-packages, 
and building ‘good’ doctor-patient relationships; the 
market environment, cultivated using medical brokers 
and referral fees to bring in fresh clientele, and receipt 
of pharmaceutical incentives; and finally, organisational 
capabilities, in this case overcoming human resource 
shortages by relying on medical staff from the public 
sector, consultant specialists, on-call and less experienced 
doctors in training, unqualified nursing staff and referring 
complicated cases to public facilities.
Conclusions In the context of low public sector capacity 
and growing healthcare demands in urban Bangladesh, 
private for-profit engagement is critical to achieving 
universal health coverage (UHC). Given the informality of 
the sector, the nascent state of healthcare financing, and 
a weak regulatory framework, the process of engagement 
must be gradual. Further research is needed to explore 
how engagement in UHC can be enabled while maintaining 
profitability. Incentives that support private sector efforts to 
improve quality, affordability and accountability are a first 
step in building this relationship.
IntrOduCtIOn
The Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG3) 
of reaching universal health coverage (UHC) 
by 2030 is challenging in pluralistic healthcare 
systems such as Bangladesh.1 The country 
is also urbanising rapidly as reflected in an 
average urban population growth rate of 3% 
per year and an astonishing 7% per year in 
poor informal settlements.2 3 If these trends 
continue, by 2040, over half of Bangladesh’s 
total population will reside in urban areas.4 
In this context, challenges to achieving 
UHC are amplified as demand for services 
increases, and the healthcare market shifts 
towards the private sector.5 6 In Bangladesh, 
reaching the SDG target 3.7—ensuring every 
person has access to affordable quality health-
care services, including financial risk protec-
tion—is particularly daunting given that 67% 
of national health expenditure is already 
out of pocket.7 However, Bangladesh is also 
a country that routinely defies expectations, 
witnessed in its spectacular health achieve-
ments over the last four decades in terms of 
reductions in total fertility rate and rates of 
maternal, infant and childhood mortality.8 
Although some of this success may be due to 
coverage of publicly financed free services,9 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This exploratory study is among the first in 
Bangladesh to query the underlying motivations and 
strategies of the urban private for-profit sector.
 ► The study employs qualitative methods to enable in-
depth understanding of factors influencing health-
care practices as reported by private facility owners 
and providers.
 ► A limitation of the study was the unwillingness of 
certain respondents to disclose strategies they 
employ to grow and flourish their private sector 
business.
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and its role in reducing use-inequities,10 the contribution 
of private healthcare sector remains poorly understood. 
This understanding is complicated by the widespread 
phenomenon of dual practice, whereby a large propor-
tion of public sector providers are also involved in private 
practice to supplement income.11 12 Given its primary 
for-profit orientation, there is widespread scepticism 
about the potential contribution of the private sector 
towards UHC. In the absence of strong regulatory capacity 
on the part of the state, these concerns relate to inap-
propriate or unnecessary care, inequitable access due to 
escalating costs and poor quality of care. As a result, the 
public sector continues to be the major focus of Govern-
ment efforts towards UHC targets.13
However, recent data suggest that neglect of this 
sector is short sighted. For example, the 2016 Bangla-
desh Maternal Mortality Survey (BMMS) shows that for 
obstetric complications, only 25.5% of women visited 
public sector facilities and the rest used some kind of 
private facility or informal provider as a first source of 
care.14 The use of the private sector for delivery services 
is also increasing. According to BMMS data, only 2.6% 
of mothers delivered in private sector facilities in 2001, 
rising to 11.3% in 2010 and 29% in 2016, whereas public 
sector delivery trended from 5.8% (2001) to 14% (2016) 
over the same period.14 The contribution of the private 
sector to the explosive growth of C-section delivery is 
particularly concerning. According to 2011 Bangladesh 
Demographic and Health Survey data, more than half of 
all C-sections took place in private sector facilities, and 
among deliveries occurring in private facilities, 72% were 
by C-section.15 A nationwide rise in C-section rates from 
17% in 2011 to 23% in 201416 implies that the private 
sector share is continuing to increase.
In Bangladesh, the private for-profit sector in health 
consists of profit-oriented businesses that charge health-
care consumers above actual service costs. The sector 
includes a heterogenous set of providers that vary in 
the degree to which they operate within or outside 
the purview of regulation, registration or oversight by 
government or professional bodies or possess formally 
recognised training. At one end of this spectrum are 
formal private for-profit hospitals and clinics offering 
diagnostics and both general and specialised medical 
treatment including surgical procedures, while at the 
other, unqualified doctors or drug sellers purvey pharma-
ceuticals whether needed or not.13 17
In urban areas, the density of private sector services is 
remarkable. Unlike rural Bangladesh where government 
healthcare infrastructure is available at district, subdis-
trict and community levels, in urban areas, the public 
health system is limited to a handful of poor functioning 
urban dispensaries and secondary and tertiary hospitals 
operated by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. 
Designated responsible for urban primary healthcare yet 
lacking implementation capacity, the Ministry of Local 
Government has contracted out primary healthcare 
services to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on 
a project basis18 19 with a predominant focus on maternal 
and child health.20 Filling the gap in public primary 
services is the urban private sector that accounts for over 
90% of healthcare facilities (online supplementary annex 
1) in urban areas.20 Nationally, data from the Directorate 
General Health Services show an increase in the number 
of registered private for-profit facilities from 1038 in 2007 
to 5023 in 2017,21 22 reflecting both a rise in demand for 
services and the inability of the public sector to generate 
sufficient supply on its own. Yet even within so-called 
formal facilities, irregular practices are common. 
For example, recent evidence from a comprehensive 
mapping of all health facilities in Sylhet City Corporation 
found that 40% of private clinics, hospitals and diagnostic 
centres had not fully complied with annual registration 
requirements.23
Despite the size of the urban private for-profit sector 
and its critical role in health service delivery in Bangla-
desh, relatively little is known about its underlying moti-
vations and business strategies. In this study, we focus on 
small and medium-sized formal private for-profit health 
facilities (between 10 and 150 bed capacity) given their 
substantial urban presence. In Dhaka alone, they repre-
sent about 55% of all hospitals and clinics, with public 
and NGO sector facilities accounting for the remaining 
19% and 26%, respectively.20 With the broader goal of 
enabling UHC in urban areas, our objectives are: (1) to 
explore the underlying motivations of owners, managers 
and providers entering into and sustaining activities in 
the small and medium-sized formal for-profit private 
healthcare business and (2) to understand how the busi-
ness strategies and incentives governing the small and 
medium-sized formal for-profit private sector enable or 
hinder quality and financial access.
To frame our exploration of business motivations 
and strategies, we draw on the Business Policy Model 
(BPM),24 the basic concepts of which still undergird 
the logic of current corporate strategy analysis.25 BPM 
is made up of three basic elements—products/markets, 
the market environment and organisational capabil-
ities—that interact to determine how a private sector 
business performs. Specifically, the model specifies 
how the financial success of a particular good or service 
offered by a private sector business is a function of its 
alignment with the market environment and the organi-
sation’s capabilities. In the case of healthcare provision, 
the goal of the private for-profit sector is to ensure that 
its products or services constitute the most ‘profitable 
value-proposition’ in the current market environment, 
that the market shows sufficient long-term demand for 
those services and that the services offered align with 
organisational capabilities to add value. Based on this 
framework, we will consider how urban small and medi-
um-sized private owners, managers and providers strate-
gise around products, markets and capabilities to ensure 
success in sustaining and growing their healthcare busi-
ness. Of particular interest is how these strategies impact 
quality and access by the urban poor.
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This exploratory qualitative study was conducted in three 
city corporations in Bangladesh and involved interviews 
with government and private sector leaders, formal 
private for-profit healthcare actors and consumers of 
these services.
study site
Three cities were purposively selected to capture a 
wide range of performance on key indicators of health-
care access and utilisation such as rates of vaccina-
tion coverage, Antenatal Care (ANC) coverage, child 
mortality and maternal mortality.15 These were: Dhaka, 
the national capital of Bangladesh, and among the fastest 
growing megacities in the world; Khulna, a divisional 
capital located in a district considered high performing 
in terms of key health indicators; and Sylhet, a divisional 
capital in one of the poorest health-performing districts 
in the country. Within each of these cities, we focus indi-
viduals involved in small to medium-sized licenced and 
registered (as reported) private for-profit healthcare 
businesses (10–150 beds) in the roles of owner, manager, 
healthcare provider and patient.
study methods and sampling strategy
A total of 80 respondents were interviewed from 
September 2013 to March 2014. In each city, key infor-
mant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with a purposive 
sample of local officials from the Ministry of Health, the 
Bangladesh Medical & Dental Council, the Bangladesh 
Medical Association, the pharmaceutical industry as well 
as members of the Private Clinic Owner’s Association. At 
the end of each KII, respondents were asked to recom-
mend the names of small and medium-sized private 
clinic owners and providers who might be willing to 
participate in in-depth interviews (IDIs). This snowball 
sampling method helped identify potential respondents 
working in a sector that is otherwise difficult to access. IDI 
respondents included private healthcare facility owners, 
managers and providers. Using a purposive sampling 
strategy, inpatient and outpatient exit interviews were also 
performed to document client experiences in the same 
facilities in which IDIs were conducted. Table 1 displays 
the types and numbers of interviews conducted in each 
study sites.
data collection
Guided by two supervisors with extensive field experience 
and expertise in qualitative methods and analysis, data 
collection was performed by 12 social science researchers. 
Semistructured KII and IDI guidelines were prepared for 
different groups of respondents. KIIs explored urban 
health challenges; the range of private care providers 
and services provided; quality of care, dual practice 
and referral mechanisms; as well as known strategies 
to maintain profitability including incentives provided 
by pharmaceutical companies. IDIs with private health-
care owners, managers and providers considered their 
underlying motivations in choosing and remaining in the 
sector; services provided and available human resources; 
linkages with other formal providers, pharmaceutical 
representatives and brokers; typical referral mechanisms; 
sustainability and quality of care practices; and challenges 
and suggestions for better coordination with the public 
sector.
Exit interviews elicited narratives concerning the 
experience and satisfaction of healthcare consumers 
frequenting private sector facilities in terms of the quality 
and affordability of services received and whether they 
intended to return to the same facility in future. In each 
city, senior researchers tapped into existing networks to 
identify a number of well-positioned key informants for 
interview, many of whom provided support in identifying 
respondents and facilitating access. These existing rela-
tionships were crucial to entrée, rapport building and 
trust in a sector that is typically closed to outsiders.
Two or three researchers were involved in each inter-
view: a facilitator and one or two note-takers. In addi-
tion to detailed hand-written field notes, interviews were 
recorded digitally. Recordings were transcribed verbatim 
into Bangla as soon as possible following data collection, 
and field notes and observations were written up in the 
same time frame. Bangla transcripts were translated into 
English by skilled translators, and a subsample of trans-
lated transcripts were reviewed and back translated by 
senior researchers to cross-check data fidelity.
data analysis
Framework analysis was performed using codes and data 
displays to systematically examine emerging patterns and 
themes.26 A team approach to analysis was employed to 
minimise individual bias with multiple analysts involved 
in coding and interpreting data. To begin, each tran-
script was coded independently on hard copy by two 
researchers. Initially, seven ‘a priori codes’ were defined 
and later inductive codes were also included in the 
coding framework. After assessing intracoder and inter-
coder reliability by having two analysts independently 
code the same sections of text, codes were applied by the 
research team using Atlas-ti. Code reports were generated 
Table 1 Types and numbers of interviews conducted in 
each study site
Types of respondents Dhaka Sylhet Khulna Total
Key informants 5 7 8 20
For-profit health facility 
owners and managers
5 5 6 16
For-profit service providers 4 5 5 14
Exit interviews with 
inpatients
5 5 5 15
Exit interviews with 
outpatients
5 5 5 15
Total 24 27 29 80
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based on ‘a priori’ themes and other inductive codes to 
facilitate the identification of patterns and themes. Data 
displays were also used to visualise patterns across catego-
ries and concepts, and permit systematic analysis.
ethical considerations
Prior to interview, written informed consent to partic-
ipate in the study was obtained from each respondent, 
as well as permission to be audio-recorded. All elements 
of consent were described to study respondents orally to 
clarify the purpose of the research, the measures under-
taken to ensure confidentiality and their right to withdraw 
from the interview at any time for any reason. Arrange-
ments for the place and time of interview were organised 
in advance according to the respondent’s convenience 
and privacy.
Patient and public involvement
The research questions and outcome measures of this 
study were identified with the participation of a technical 
advisory group composed of formal healthcare owners, 
managers and providers, policy makers and academics. 
Neither patients nor the public were involved in study 
design. Patient involvement was limited to participation in 
exit interviews that captured their experiences and satis-
faction with care received from formal private for-profit 
clinics. Study findings were shared and discussed through 
a series of dissemination workshops involving interna-
tional and bilateral donors, researchers, government 
officials from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
involved in hospital services management, planning and 
quality improvement, as well as leaders from professional 
medical, nursing and private clinic associations.
results
Motivations of private healthcare owners, managers and 
providers
To understand the motivations underlying the involve-
ment of private sector actors in the healthcare market, 
respondents were asked to describe how they came to be 
involved in the sector and their reasons for sustaining 
their business. Two groups of motivational factors 
emerged from analysis: financial and personal.
The monetary rewards associated with running a 
successful healthcare business were a strong pull factor 
motivating entry into the private sector. The industry was 
widely perceived as financially lucrative and therefore an 
appealing professional choice. Formal for-profit business 
owners described how profit is a central motivation and 
that the provision of quality care is critical to ensuring 
‘good’ business, that is, financial gain. One doctor in 
Sylhet explained, ‘the main reason I entered the private sector 
was business. I worked in a small town near Dhaka city. 55–60 
private clinics are there in that small town. All are running 
well, also gaining profit…’. They also explained how profit 
was generated when necessary services are provided that 
the public sector is unable to furnish due to insufficient 
capacity.
There was also a general assumption that working as 
a doctor in the private sector ensured financial security 
given the rising demand for services in urban areas. Many 
providers further described how the opportunity for 
a stable income for themselves and their families was a 
key reason for joining and remaining in the profession. 
According to one private provider in Khulna: ‘The thing 
that attracted me to this profession is financial solvency… I 
assumed that I will have a superior financial status and I 
(sustained) that by joining this profession’.
In addition to financial interests, personal motivations 
also played a role in entering the private healthcare profes-
sion. First among these was the desire to furnish needed 
services to the public and the personal fulfilment that 
this yields. A number of respondents noted a particular 
concern for the poor, the vulnerable and the disadvan-
taged who frequently lack access to quality care. For these 
providers, a commitment to rectify these inequities was 
identified as an impetus for entering the private health-
care sector and a reason for continuing their professional 
engagement.
At the other end of the spectrum was personal ambi-
tion. For some respondents, the desire for social status 
associated with a career in healthcare, and conferred to 
specialist doctors in particular, was an important factor 
motivating their decision to engage in private sector 
practice. Others indicated their aspirations to be part of 
a challenging, fast-growing profession. Frequent refer-
ence was also made to the expectations and ambitions of 
family members. Pressures from family to pursue private 
medical practice were widely cited, largely due to the 
perceived status and income it commands, or because an 
existing family business needed to be sustained. As one 
provider from Khulna explained: ‘This business is in our 
family. The forefathers of my father used to run it, after them, my 
father. I practiced with my father for a very long time, then after 
(his) death I took charge’.
In a number of instances particular personal circum-
stances compelled entry into the private healthcare 
market. One clinic owner and provider described his deci-
sion to start a clinic following his mother’s death and his 
desire to do something concrete in her memory: ‘When I 
started my fourth year of medical school, my mother died. At that 
time, I couldn’t take care of my mother due to my studies. I estab-
lished this clinic in (her) name’. Similarly, a clinic manager 
in Dhaka claimed that an experience with poor quality 
healthcare prompted the creation of the facility in which 
he worked: ‘Our Director’s child died in a renowned hospital 
of Bangladesh … because of the carelessness of the doctors and 
nurses. So, our Director decided to build a NICU where patients 
will not face such kinds of carelessness’.
Interesting in these narratives was the spectrum of 
reasons why our respondents came to be involved in the 
private healthcare sector ranging from the profit-seeking 
motivations we typically associate with the sector to a 
desire to serve the public. Recognising this complexity of 
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motivations helps clarify the strategies the sector employs 
in maintaining their healthcare business and how they 
might be leveraged to increase access to the urban poor.
business strategies of private healthcare owners, managers 
and providers
Private formal health sector actors reported multiple 
strategies to ensure business success and sustainability. 
These strategies helped them increase client flow and 
satisfaction and derive profits out of the services provided. 
Adapting the BPM to the context of private sector health-
care, we consider these strategies under the broad head-
ings of products and services, the market environment 
and organisational capabilities. A particular interest in 
this exploration is how strategies in these areas can either 
facilitate or hinder access by the urban poor.
Products/services
A number of strategies were identified whereby for-profit 
healthcare businesses aimed to make their services 
more appealing to both current and potential clientele. 
One such strategy was the use of patient discounts. The 
majority of private practitioners interviewed reported 
using discounts to entice new patients and to reward 
existing client loyalty. However, philanthropic motiva-
tions were also common, with many private sector clinics 
offering discounts to allow poorer patients access to 
services they otherwise could not afford. As one private 
sector provider explained:
There is not a fixed percent, but they do so according 
to the (financial) state of the patient… Normally we 
grant 15% discounts for tests and 10% for the bed 
rent. Sometimes we have to give more – even above 
50%.
Another widespread strategy was the provision of health 
packages that bundled services and products together 
at a fixed price for procedures such as C-section and 
appendicectomy surgery. This decreased costs to patients 
compared with the cumulative price of individual services 
and, in some instances, created opportunity for negotia-
tion between clinics and clients. While this practice was 
reported to increase patient flow, in certain instances, 
they had detrimental financial consequences especially 
when patient complications required additional, unan-
ticipated tests and procedures that the package did not 
include, yet the clinic was obliged to cover.
Finally, almost all private providers mentioned the 
importance of cultivating a positive and trusting doctor–
patient relationship as crucial to ensuring client loyalty 
and continuity of care. Respondents described efforts 
made within the clinical setting to make patients feel 
valued and comfortable, recognising that client percep-
tions of provider behaviour and attitudes are important 
determinants of whether they adhere to treatment or 
return for subsequent visits. As explained by a doctor in 
Sylhet:
While the first aim is that the patient gets cured, my 
behaviour is also important… We, the doctors… tell 
our students that not all diseases are organic. Some 
are psychosomatic (and hence) our behaviour with 
patients is a major factor in providing care. The pa-
tient (must) have faith in a doctor that he will be 
cured … The doctor must create such faith through 
conversations and discussion time (with patients) …
Our findings revealed that positive perceptions of 
provider conduct were not contingent on the dura-
tion of wait time for consultation, nor the length of the 
provider–patient interaction. Interviews with patients 
exiting private facilities revealed that even though 
average consultation times were only 6–7 min in length 
and wait times varied between 5 min and 2 hours and 30 
min, reports of patient satisfaction with private sector 
services were uniformly positive. Many noted their provid-
er’s efforts to make them feel comfortable and the quality 
of services received. As described by one patient leaving a 
private clinic in Khulna: ‘The quality of service is good here… 
much better than other facilities. The (doctor’s) behaviour is very 
good… he examined me carefully, the nurses, duty doctors and 
the doctor visited me regularly…’.
The provision of extended service hours was another 
strategy that was widely perceived to offer a competitive 
advantage over the daytime operations of NGO clinics by 
offering greater access to the working population.
Market environment
A number of strategies were used to maintain market 
position and cultivate demand for private sector services. 
Among these was reliance on medical brokers or Dalals as 
a means to ensure patient flow. Employed by many private 
healthcare facilities to divert or convince clients to use 
their services, Dalals typically operate near the entrance 
of public hospitals or in areas of the city where new 
migrants to the city first settle. A number of respondents 
also indicated that informal providers such as drug sellers 
and unlicenced or ‘village’ doctors may also act as Dalal 
for formal private clinics, receiving payment according 
to the number of patients referred, or in other cases, a 
percentage of service charges. A private clinic manager 
from Dhaka explained the importance of this strategy:
Many patients are referred (through agents or bro-
kers). Relatives of a patient who have received services 
from us (in the past), may also increase publicity. (In 
return) we give them services at low cost.
Public sector providers are similarly known to act as 
middlemen, referring patients to their own private prac-
tices or those in which they are shareholders. In other 
instances, providers described referring patients to other 
private facilities and, like Dalal, receiving a commis-
sion for referral. While some of these referrals may be 
clinically indicated, a number of stakeholders reported 
that this practice of ‘referral for commission’ was wide-
spread among private sector doctors, diagnostic centres 
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and clinics and used to boost revenue through collu-
sion. A top-ranked government health officer in Khulna 
described the involvement of doctors in referral and the 
financial benefits that are accrued:
Suppose, I am an owner of a diagnostic centre. Many 
brokers are available to me. I will tell them to collect 
patients from wherever they can, (and) they will be 
given a percentage. If, a doctor sends patients to me 
for pathology (testing), I will give him a 40% or 50% 
commission. If I get 2000 taka (USD 23.72) by doing 
the pathology, then 1000 (USD 11.86) taka is for me 
and the other 1000 (USD 11.86) is for the doctor – 
the doctor is happy, and so am I. If 10 patients are 
sent daily, he will receive 10,000 BDT (USD 118.59). 
(Likewise), if I refer patients to the doctor’s facility, 
he will send patients to my diagnostic service for tests.
Although these practices were perceived to increase 
patient flow, several stakeholders noted how referrals 
orchestrated by brokers may be disadvantageous to the 
urban poor. Diverting patients away from free government 
services towards private sector providers, brokers effec-
tively increased the cost of care and the patient’s financial 
burden and even more when treatment is unnecessary.
Another practice that nurtures the market environ-
ment for private sector services was the close relationship 
with pharmaceutical companies. Nearly all private prac-
titioners described regular visits from pharmaceutical 
representatives on a monthly, weekly or even daily basis 
with the purpose of marketing their products. They also 
reported receiving incentives to buy and prescribe certain 
drugs, although this practice is prohibited by the Govern-
ment’s Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices, which 
states that ‘no gift or financial inducement shall be 
offered or given to members of the medical profession 
for purposes of sales or promotion’.27 Incentives in the 
form of money, drug samples and gifts were received 
routinely, and many admitted their influence on prescrip-
tion patterns. As one clinic owner explained:
… month after month, different companies pay doc-
tors for recommending their medicines… even giving 
cash…now if doctors recommend (these drugs), we 
have little choice (but to keep them in our store)…
Another provider from Sylhet described how the ubiq-
uitous presence of pharmaceutical representatives had 
effectively changed his prescription practices:
I generally prescribe those medicines which work 
effectively; still there are some influences such as 
medical representatives (who) come frequently. They 
come in the morning, in the evening, automatical-
ly we need to keep their medicines …we use those, 
prescribe those, but we don’t (always) get to check 
ourselves whether they work or not.
This strategy of cultivating and sustaining provider 
loyalty is carefully calculated, as one pharmaceutical 
representative in Khulna recounted:
I see which pharmaceutical company’s medicine the 
doctor is prescribing… We get data from different 
sources. Some are paid 1 00 000 taka (USD 1185.95) 
annually, or 3000 (USD 35.58) to 5000 taka (USD 
59.30) monthly… then I request him (doctor) to 
kindly give me a chance and make him a monetary 
offer. If he agrees then I provide him the agreed 
amount monthly or yearly. Then he writes our drug 
in the prescription.
A number of key stakeholders expressed concern 
about the consequences of pharmaceutical influence on 
patients, including the development of antibiotic resist-
ance and financial impoverishment by obliging patients 
to purchase expensive and sometimes unneeded medi-
cines. Private sector providers were also aware of the 
negative consequences of aggressive pharmaceutical 
marketing such as the prescription of low-quality drugs, 
and some expressed concern that decisions about what 
drugs to stock may be determined by price and discounts 
received and not what is best for the patient in terms 
of treatment efficacy. As one pharmaceutical company 
manager explained, sometimes drugs purveyed by phar-
maceutical reps are not even intended for the local 
market:
Sometimes they (medical representatives) they sell a 
product not meant for local sale to medicine shops at 
a discounted rate […] then motivate drug sellers and 
doctors not to sell another company’s product as they 
will not get any benefit from them.
Interestingly, several private sector providers justified 
their relationship with pharmaceutical representatives by 
explaining their practice of passing on free drug samples 
to patients with less capacity to pay—for prices well below 
standard rates.
Organisational capabilities
Many respondents noted the continual challenge of 
ensuring adequate, trained human resources in an increas-
ingly competitive urban healthcare market. A consequent 
practice by private clinics was the use of medical staff from 
the public sector as consultants for specialist and general 
services. Duty doctors were most often medical staff with 
less experience, including honorary trainees, postgrad-
uate medical students and occasionally interns. As office 
hours in public hospitals typically extend from 08:00 to 
14:00, in theory, public sector doctors that engage in 
private sector practice are only available later in the day. 
As one clinic owner from Sylhet noted, staff shortages and 
the provision of specialised services in particular were 
therefore limited during morning hours: ‘The consultants 
are mostly from the public medical college. So, we face this (doctor 
shortage) problem from 8:00am-3:00pm.’
Other respondents noted that the practice of 
public sector doctors attending patients at private facili-
ties during office hours was not uncommon, with a clinic 
manager from Dhaka, asserting: ‘It is not ethical that, in 
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some clinics of this area, the doctors and trainees of the Govern-
ment Medical College see patients in between office hours’,
One common strategy to overcome doctor shortages 
during daytime hours was the use of on-call doctors. 
These doctors typically practice in public sector facil-
ities in close proximity to a private sector clinic that 
relies on their services and will respond to calls when 
needed. As one clinic owner (and provider) from Sylhet 
explained: ‘Within a few minutes we come to see the patients. 
Within five to ten minutes the specialist also comes here. If we 
are informed we come here from anywhere. Or another specialist 
comes to manage everything’.
This strategy was popular among private clinic owners 
given its perceived cost savings over standard practices 
of recruiting and paying the salaries of three doctors to 
cover a 24-hour service or having to hire specialist doctors 
full time when their services are not always needed. It was 
also noted that the strategy was not without hazards. Given 
that many private clinics rely on commonly performed 
surgeries (C-sections and appendectomies) to ensure 
financial sustainability, in the context of life-threatening 
complications, reliance on on-call doctors who are located 
off-site may substantially heighten risk to patients.
Recruiting and retaining qualified nurses was also 
identified as a major challenge by many private sector 
respondents. As a result, nursing care was often provided 
by unqualified or untrained persons such as cleaners 
and ayas who are meant to provide non-technical care-
giving support to patients and their families. According 
to private sector respondents, the reliance on unqualified 
personnel was due to the dearth of qualified nurses on 
the market and the high salaries they command. As one 
clinic owner from Dhaka despaired:
It is impossible for me to keep 6 nurses (on staff); 
it is not possible for any clinic to give 60 000 taka 
(USD 711.57) for their salary (10 000 taka each, 
USD 118.59). Maybe it is possible for (large private 
hospitals like) Apollo and Square, but not for me. 
(Instead) we must hire secondary school certificate 
girls and train them on the job…
In circumstances when a private sector clinic is unable 
to handle a complicated case due to lack of capacity, 
referral to public hospitals and medical colleges was 
justified. Respondents noted this practice was especially 
common among patients requiring specialty care or 
those with emergent, deteriorating or potentially fatal 
health conditions. Several providers further noted the 
reputational risk in being held responsible for a patient’s 
death and hence the reliance on referral as a strategy to 
avoid potential fatalities that might damage their profes-
sional reputation or that of the facility in which they 
work. Referral shifted responsibility for potential accusa-
tions of malpractice to the receiving facility, which most 
commonly was the city’s public hospital. As one private 
sector owner/provider from Khulna admitted, ‘We don’t 
take the risk of keeping critical patients. They are referred to the 
Government Hospital, where there are ICU facilities, or to larger 
private hospitals based on their (financial) ability’.
This widespread practice highlights broader limitations 
in critical care capacity within urban areas that need to be 
addressed.28 29 It can also exacerbate the vulnerability of 
the urban poor, as the referral destination is often deter-
mined based on ability to pay. Even if a private hospital 
is closest, many providers stated that they were more apt 
to refer poorer patients to public facilities or medical 
colleges, while better-off patients were sent to closer 
private facilities. Patient’s desires, frequently motivated 
by perceived quality of services, was a further factor influ-
encing referral patterns. More virtuous behaviour was 
also reported. Some providers stated that their referral 
decisions were based on the quality of care provided at 
the receiving facility, and several claimed that instead of 
taking commissions from referral facilities, they asked 
that patient discounts be provided instead.
Interestingly, almost all of the respondents in the 
study acknowledged that the absence of a formalised 
referral system contributed to poor health outcomes and 
described the challenge of patients arriving too late for 
effective treatment. Suggestions were also made that a 
formal referral system be implemented to assist primary 
providers in ensuring patients be directed to appropriate 
levels of care.
dIsCussIOn
This exploratory study is among the first in Bangladesh 
to query the underlying motivations and strategies of 
the urban private for-profit sector and their implications 
for healthcare quality and accessibility. However, certain 
limitations must be acknowledged. The most challenging 
of these was the reluctance of some private sector respon-
dents to divulge details about the strategies they employ 
to grow their business. In other instances, respondents 
may have constructed their replies in a socially desirable 
manner to mitigate judgement about the business strat-
egies they employ, especially if unethical or informal 
practises were revealed. Although efforts were made to 
maximise trust by approaching respondents through 
personal contacts and social networks, richer and more 
trustworthy data might have been produced had a 
lengthier period of rapport building been possible. While 
a risk of selection bias was inherent in our approach, 
this was justified given our concern that private sector 
respondents would not divulge their business strategies 
to strangers. Selection bias may also have occurred in exit 
interviews as clients may have been more inclined to give 
a positive evaluation of the quality of care received at the 
time of discharge.
An interesting first insight emerging from analysis was 
the complexity of motivations prompting involvement in 
the private for-profit sector. IDIs with owners, managers 
and providers challenged widespread perceptions that 
financial interests are the singular driving force for 
engagement in private healthcare business. Rather, public 
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service, social status and family obligation figured prom-
inently alongside profit and financial security as factors 
motivating participation. Leveraging these non-finan-
cial motivations might serve to further encourage social 
responsibility in the sector or potential participation in 
health financing schemes that aim to increase affordable 
healthcare access to the urban poor. That being said, 
private sector engagement is ultimately contingent on 
success in turning a profit.30 In other words, the scope for 
market expansion must be sufficient to support lower per 
patient revenues typically associated with fee for service 
and prepayment schemes.31–33
In this paper, the analysis of strategies was usefully 
structured around the BPM.24 25 As the model specifies, 
in order to deliver a profitable value proposition, private 
healthcare actors must employ strategies that enable 
a best fit between the products or services offered, the 
market environment and their organisation’s capabilities. 
In this discussion, we consider each of these components 
to gain insight about the complex ecosystem in which the 
urban private sector is located and the manner in which 
business interests are pursued within a competitive health-
care market. Of particular interest is how the strategies 
employed are conducive to achieving greater efficiency, 
equity or scale and their implications for Bangladesh’s 
broader policy goals in support of UHC.
As regards products and services, there was a near-con-
sensus viewpoint among study respondents about the 
necessity of providing patient-friendly services and 
making patients ‘happy’. These objectives appear to be 
backed up by a range of ‘patient-loyalty’ strategies that 
included ‘good’ provider behaviour, the discretionary 
use of discounts on consultation fees, drugs and proce-
dures and offering extended service hours convenient 
to the working population. Interestingly, however, exit 
interviews with patients revealed that consultation time 
was only slightly longer than public sector facilities and 
did not appear to be an important factor influencing 
patient perceptions of quality.34 These results corre-
spond with global evidence that patients are willing to 
pay for private healthcare if they perceive providers are 
respectful and responsive to their needs35 36 and that 
good provider–patient relations increase the likelihood 
of sustained treatment seeking,37 38 and attracting new 
clientele. Indeed, adapting service pricing and delivery 
modalities to the needs and preferences of healthcare 
customers is emblematic of private sector practice glob-
ally.39 This behaviour can be explained by the aspiration 
to gain and sustain market share through customer loyalty 
when other private sector actors or NGOs may be offering 
lower cost services.
To ensure their position in a crowded healthcare 
market, many private sector respondents indicated their 
reliance on brokers and agents. Referral fees paid to 
these middlemen ensured a fresh client flow and compet-
itive advantage. Among those ‘captured’ were patients 
diverted from government facilities where services are 
free. Very similar was the widespread practice of offering 
referral fees to doctors who direct their patients to 
preferred private sector clinics.30 In both cases, these 
practices are only effective market strategies if the costs 
incurred amplify profit. It was unclear, however, whether 
such calculations were made, and the extent to which 
they end up being subsidised by patient out-of-pocket 
expenditures.7
The role of pharmaceutical agents in shaping the 
market environment and the prescription practices of 
private sector doctors was also widely acknowledged. Many 
private sector respondents valued the incentives that they 
receive from pharmaceutical companies, some of which 
are passed onto patients, such as discounted prices on 
‘free’ medicine samples. A few others expressed concerns 
that the medicines pushed by pharmaceutical representa-
tives were expensive or unknown in terms of efficacy. The 
adverse influence of pharmaceutical incentives on private 
sector business has been emphasised by others,40–42 and 
it is well recognised that aggressive marketing strategies 
undermine patient safety and ethical medical conduct 
and need firm regulation.40–44
Capacity constraints related to human resources, espe-
cially of nursing staff and specialist doctors, were almost 
universally identified by private sector respondents. At 
the same time, concerns related to the costs of keeping 
full-time staff were also acknowledged. A variety of 
workaround strategies were reported to overcome gaps 
and minimise costs such as the use of on-call specialists 
from the public sector, reliance on doctors in training 
or recent medical graduates, as well as filling sector-wide 
short-falls in the number of nurses through onsite and 
unregulated nurse training to unqualified personnel. The 
implications of these adaptive mechanisms in terms of 
quality and costs to the public health system and patient 
safety warrant assessment. Moreover, these strategies 
provide insights into some of drivers of the widespread 
phenomena of ‘dual practice’ that many health systems 
struggle to manage from cost, quality and accountability 
perspectives.13 30 45 46
Other strategies employed to overcome capacity limita-
tions included the referral of complicated cases to public 
sector tertiary facilities. Several respondents noted that 
the absence of a formal urban referral system inclusive 
of both private and public sectors heightens patient risk 
as inappropriate or late referrals may result. The devel-
opment of a system that identifies the fastest and safest 
route to appropriate critical care services, whatever the 
location, represents a critical area for policy attention. 
This includes the transfer of patient information so that 
expensive diagnostic tests are not needlessly repeated,47 
enhanced capacity for first aid services to ensure that 
patients are stabilised during transport and the avail-
ability of proximate and effective ambulatory services.
Although our study was focused on so-called ‘formal’ 
small to medium-sized private health facilities in urban 
Bangladesh, striking was the degree to which ‘informality’ 
characterised most aspects of their business model ranging 
from the way prices were levied, health workers deployed 
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and business hours set. Not a single respondent indicated 
the existence of a written business plan or even standard 
operating procedures to guide the day-to-day or longer term 
development of services. Similarly lacking was a formal or 
standardised system of reporting on the volume, quality or 
costs of services provided. Paradoxically, ‘professional repu-
tation’—subjectively or tacitly determined by the ‘public’—
was noted as critical to sustaining a successful healthcare 
business. In short, we observed a variety of stopgap strate-
gies that align services, market environment and are illus-
trative of a sector that is getting by but with little apparent 
emphasis on achieving greater efficiency or scale.
This qualitative exploration of the motivations and 
business strategies of those involved in small and medi-
um-sized urban private for-profit healthcare delivery 
offers insight on how this sector might be harnessed 
more effectively towards the broader national policy aims 
of UHC. Features of the sector that represent strengths 
or positive assets include professed motivations of service, 
patient-centredness and responsiveness, innovative 
approaches to pricing, sensitivity to differential ability 
to pay and the desire to maintain a professional reputa-
tion within the healthcare market. These features have 
established the sector’s legitimacy and dominance in the 
urban context and account for its popularity as a source 
of care.30 39 45 They also align to some degree with UHC 
goals of affordable access to quality healthcare without 
risk of financial harm.
At the same time, certain adverse practices exist that 
are contrary to Bangladesh’s aspirations for UHC.48 
Patient brokers and pharmaceutical incentives are likely 
to lead to oversupply of services and overprescription 
that do not match with needs and may promote public 
health threats such as antimicrobial resistance.49 Further-
more, staffing models that rely on part-time, junior and 
unregulated training pose serious problems with quality 
and safety of services. From an affordability perspective, 
accessibility among the poorest segments of the popula-
tion is unclear, and the pay-per-service model of provision 
is likely to strain household budgets and push significant 
numbers into poverty.50 51
Given the size and centrality of this sector to urban 
health in Bangladesh.,20 23 the policy conundrum becomes 
how best to amplify strengths and shore-up shortfalls 
of this important segment of the urban health system. 
Perhaps the most challenging attribute of the sector is its 
inherent informality in a broader health systems context 
that is also characterised by weak governance, particularly 
in urban areas. This context argues against sweeping de 
jure regulatory reforms on multiple fronts as they are 
highly unlikely to be implemented in any meaningful way. 
Rather, more discrete, focused efforts on specific parts of 
the sector, that is, pharmaceutical prescription practices 
that engage the principal actors in changing behaviours, 
may be more effective in nudging the private sector more 
towards the goals of UHC.
While our findings are appropriately contextualised 
for urban Bangladesh, they also resonate with other 
low-income and middle-income countries characterised 
by increasing urban healthcare demand, a growing private 
sector and a weak regulatory environment.52 However, the 
need remains for nuanced ethnographic work that exam-
ines the particularities of a highly diverse sector and the 
unique manner in which products, markets and capacity 
are aligned to sustain successful business.53 Under-
standing these complexities and the larger ecosystem in 
which the private sector operates will lend itself to poli-
cies that are fit for purpose and effective in harnessing 
supply and ensuing quality and affordable access to the 
urban poor.
COnClusIOn
In urban Bangladesh, the private for-profit sector plays 
a crucial role in meeting a growing demand for health-
care in a context of limited public provision. Within this 
massive, heterogeneous yet predominantly informal range 
of providers, small and medium-sized private clinics and 
hospitals are important purveyors of so-called ‘formal’ 
healthcare services. Focusing on the motivations and strat-
egies undergirding urban private healthcare business, our 
findings confirm prevailing assumptions about the sector’s 
profit orientation, informality and sometimes deleterious 
practices. At the same time, certain strategies yield bene-
fits to healthcare consumers like the sector’s emphasis on 
responsive, patient-friendly services. Given the weak regu-
latory capacity of national and local authorities and profes-
sional associations alike, the provision of incentives that 
promote greater accountability within the private for-profit 
sector and reward efforts to increase the affordability and 
quality of services may be a more realistic strategy towards 
UHC. Support in extending the private sector’s largely 
curative focus to include preventive and promotive services 
is also critical given the lacunae of primary care services in 
urban areas. Most importantly, policies that support UHC 
within the realities of a highly pluralistic health market must 
accommodate the financial interests of this massive, diverse 
and growing private sector. Policies and programmes that 
encourage private sector quality and effectiveness, and 
enable even greater market share, may function to drive out 
the subset of private sector players whose business model 
relies on overcharging, oversupplying or providing substan-
dard care.
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